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IV 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The state appeals from the District Court's order suppressing evidence obtained as a 
result of a warrantless blood draw after a refusal of a breath and blood test. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
A sheriff s deputy observed a car driven at speeds in excess of 60 miles per hour in a 
marked 25 mile per hour zone. (R. p. 7) The car stopped in response to the deputy's lights, 
and the deputy made contact with the cars' driver, Micah Wulff. (Id.) Wulff admitted he 
"shouldn't be driving" and his car smelled strongly of an alcoholic beverage. (Id.) Wulff 
admitted drinking and failed field sobriety tests. (Id.) Wulff stated he would not participate in 
a breath test so the deputy took him to a hospital. (Id.) Wulff initially refused giving a blood 
sample and told the nurse "you're not touching me." (R. pp 7) When two security officers 
approached he allowed for the blood draw without further resistance. (R. p. 7-8) 
The state charged Wulff with felony DUI. (R. pp 44-45) Wulff moved to suppress the 
results of the blood draw because the state failed to obtain a search warrant. (R. 53-56) (R. 
73-75) (R. 82-85) The District Court granted the motion, concluding that: "the recent United 
States Supreme Court case Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. (2013) places new limits on 
the ability oflaw enforcement to conduct a blood test without a warrant." Finding the U.S. 
Supreme Court held: "in these drunk driving investigations where police officers can 
reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly 
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undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so." 
569 U.S. __ (2013) (R. p. 100-101) The state filed a notice of appeal. (R. p. 111-113) 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Did the District Court correctly hold that Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. __ (2013) 
places new limits on the ability of law enforcement to conduct a blood test without a warrant 
(R. p. 100-101 & p. 111-113) and suppression of the warrantless blood draw was required? 
(R. p. 106-108) 
III. ARGUMENT 
The District Court correctly held that Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. __ (2013) 
places new limits on the ability of law enforcement to conduct a blood test 
without a warrant and suppression of the warrantless blood draw is required. 
(R. pp 106-108) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The District Court concluded that Missouri v. McNeely, __ U.S. __ ,133 S. Ct. 
1552 (2013) "places new limits on the ability of law enforcement to conduct a blood test 
without a warrant." (R. p. 100-101) (R. p. 11-113) The court held that "In McNeely, the 
U.S. Supreme Court stated that "[W]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving 
suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the 
circumstances." McNeely, 569 U.S. (2013) (R. p. 103) That to adopt the states 
argument would "in essence, act as a per se exception to the warrant requirement. In tum, 
implied consent statutes would have the effect of making the McNeely decision of little or 
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no consequence ......... Therefore, despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court did not 
directly discuss implied consent statutes, interpreting the McNeely opinion as permitting 
forced blood draw's simply because a state has legislation that allows such action would 
render the McNeely decision a dead letter." (R. p. 103) 
B. STANDARDOFREVIEW 
The standard of review of a District Court order granting or denying a suppression 
motion is bifurcated factual findings are accepted unless clearly erroneous, but the Court 
freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts found. State v. 
Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 P.3d 183, 183 (2009) 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT MISSOURI V. 
MCNEELY, 569 U.S. _ (2013) PLACES NEW LIMITS ON THE ABILITY 
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT TO CONDUCT A BLOOD TEST WITHOUT 
A WARRANT AND SUPPRESSION OF THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD 
DRAW IS REQUIRED. 
"Administration of a blood alcohol testing constitutes a seizure ofthe person, and a 
search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment." State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 
243 P.3d 1093, 1095 (Ct. App. 2010) citing Schumber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 
86 S. Ct. 1826, 1833-34, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 917-918 (1966); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 
302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007) (other citation omitted). Searches and seizures performed 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Id. (citation omitted) (R. p. 98-99) 
The District Court went on to hold: "Under Idaho's implied consent statute, anyone 
who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle is deemed to have impliedly 
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consented to evidentiary testing for alcohol when an officer who has reasonable grounds 
to believe in an individual is driving under the influence requests this testing. LeClercq, 
149 Idaho at_, 243 P.3d at 1095-96, quoting Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302,160 P.3d at 741 
(other citation omitted); I.C. § 18-8002(1). Such implied consent is an exception to the 
warrant requirement. Id. at 1095, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. 
Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (other citation omitted) This implied consent to 
evidentiary testing includes testing of a suspect's blood or urine under I.C. § 18-8002, in 
addition to Breathalyzer testing the test requested is of the officer's choosing. Diaz, 144 
Idaho at 302,160 P.3d at 741 citing Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833,41 P.3d 257,261 
(2002). 
According to Idaho case law, the right of an officer to order a blood draw is not 
limited by LC. § 18-8002(6)(b). Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. Under I.C. § 18-
8002(6)(b), an order for a blood draw must be supported by probable cause that one of 
the enumerated crimes, such as aggravated DUI or vehicular manslaughter, have 
occurred. I.e. § 18-8002(6)(b). However, in Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833-34,41 
P.3d 257,261-62 (2002), the Supreme Court ofIdaho "held that Idaho Code § 18-
8002( 6)(b) limits only when an officer can order medical personnel to administer a blood 
withdrawal but does not otherwise limit when an officer 'may request that a defendant 
peacefully submit to a blood withdrawal.'" Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742 
(quotingHalen, 136 Idaho at 834, 41 P.3d at 262 (emphasis supplied». 
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Despite the fact that "[n]othing in Idaho Code § 18-8002 limits the officer's authority 
to require a defendant to submit to a blood draw[,]" the recent United States Supreme 
Court Case Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. _(2013), places new limits on the ability of 
law enforcement to conduct a blood test without a warrant. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 
P.3d at 742. In McNeely, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "[i]n those drunk-driving 
investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood 
sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the 
Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so." 569 U.S. CR. p. 99-101) 
Ultimately, the District Court found that "After Defendant refused the breath 
test. ... Deputy Larson did not obtain a warrant prior to the blood draw." (R. p. 102) The 
court further held: "there is no evidence or allegation that Defendant gave his consent to 
blood draw, only that with the implied threat of force he succumbed to the test." (R. p. 
102) 
The court noted that the state argued that "once implied consent had been given by an 
individual who has taken advantage ofthe privilege of driving on Idaho's roads that 
individual cannot withdraw the implied consent." (R. p. 102) 
The District Court correctly articulated the unconditional conditions doctrine which 
prohibits the government from conditioning the grant of a privilege upon the waiver of a 
constitutional right. The U.S. Supreme Court set forth the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine in Frost v. R.R. Comm In of State of Cal.: 
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[i]t would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation 
which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights 
guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same 
result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for 
a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not 
necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having 
power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it 
sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited, 
and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require 
the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the 
surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like 
manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties 
embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated 
out of existence. 
Frost v. R.R. Comm'n of State ofCa!., 271 U.S. 583,593-94,46 S. Ct. 605, 607, 70 L. Ed. 
1101 (1926)(emphasis ours) The doctrine has been applied in a number of jurisdictions, 
including Arizona and Georgia, to the granting of the privilege to drive. Those courts 
dealing with the issue have all held that the doctrine prevents the conditioning of the 
privilege to drive upon the waiver of one's Fourth amendment rights. As it is now clear, 
following McNeely, that motorists have a Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
warrantless blood draws, absent a true showing of exigent circumstances, the state is not 
free to condition the granting of the privilege to drive upon a citizen's waiver of that right. 
In other words, consent may not be "implied" with respect to warrantless blood draws. 
Idaho's implied consent law purports to condition the privilege to drive upon one 
giving their implied consent to a warrantless blood draw upon law enforcement's 
suspicion ofDUI. Idaho's Implied consent Statute, I.e. § 18-8002 provides in part: 
(1) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in 
this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for 
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concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have 
given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other 
intoxicating substances, provided that such testing is administered at the request 
of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been 
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the 
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code. 
I.C. § 18-8002(1) Defendant recognizes that several Idaho courts, prior to McNeely, have 
held that a driver was deemed to have given his "implied" consent to a warrantless blood 
draw merely by driving upon the roadways of the state: 
[u]nder Idaho's implied consent statute, I.C. § 18-8002(1), anyone driving on 
Idaho roads is deemed to have impliedly consented to evidentiary testing for 
the presence of alcohol or drugs when a police officer has reasonable cause to 
believe the person was driving under the influence. In other words, "[b]y 
virtue of this statute, 'anyone who accepts the privilege of operating a motor 
vehicle upon Idaho's highways has consented in advance to submit to a BAC 
test.' " Rodriguez, 128 Idaho at 523,915 P.2d at 1381 (quoting Matter of 
McNeely, 119 Idaho 182, 187,804 P.2d 911,916 (Ct.App.1990)). See also 
Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,160 P.3d 739. Implied consent to evidentiary testing is 
not limited to a breathalyzer test, but may also include testing the suspect's 
blood or urine. I.e. § 18-8002(9) 
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 712-13, 184 P.3d 215,218-19 (Ct. App. 2008). 
However, Defendant would argue that such a conditional grant of the privilege to drive 
was not considered to afoul of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine due to the fact that 
under pre-McNeely jurisprudence it was believed that an individual held no constitutional 
right to be free from warrantless blood draws. See, State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 306, 328 
P.2d 1065, 1071 (1958); see also, State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 489, 680 P.2d 1383, 
1389 (Ct. App. 1984) As the McNeely decision has changed the constitutional landscape 
in this regard, and it is settled that motorists do in fact have a protected Fourth 
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Amendment right to be free from warrantless blood draws, the State is prohibited from 
conditioning the granting ofthe privilege to drive upon a waiver of that right. 
Due to the recency of the McNeely decision, only this recent District Court 
decision has ruled on the constitutionality of states implied consent statutes with respect 
to compelled blood draws. However, as stated infra, a number of courts have dealt with 
the issue of statutorily implying consent to warrantless blood draws where the Fourth 
Amendment would otherwise prohibit such a search, e.g. where probable cause was 
lacking to suspect the motorist ofDUl. In each such case those Courts held that the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibited the legislature from conditioning the grant 
of the privilege to drive upon the waiver ofthe protections of the Fourth Amendment. In 
other words, those courts held that the legislature could not circumvent the Fourth 
Amendment by "implying" consent to an otherwise unlawful search. State v. Quinn, 218 
Ariz. 66, 72-73, 178 P.3d 1190, 1196-97 (Ct. App. 2008), Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 
289-91,587 S.E.2d 605,611-12 (2003), Hannay v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977, 986-87 on 
reh'g~ 793 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) 
In State v. Quinn~ the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled on the constitutionality of a 
section of the Arizona implied consent law which purported to "imply" a motorists' 
consent to warrantless blood draws absent probable cause to believe the motorist to have 
been DUI. Specifically, the statute at issue sought to imply consent in every instance 
where a motorist was involved in an accident which resulted in death or serious injury to 
another. State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 69, 178 P.3d 1190, 1193 (Ct. App. 2008) The 
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defendant, Quinn, was involved in such an accident. It was undisputed that law 
enforcement did not possess probable cause to believe Quinn to be DUL Nevertheless, 
acting under authority of Arizona's implied consent statute, law enforcement extracted 
blood without a warrant and absent actual consent. The State of Arizona argued that 
consent was implied by the operation of statute: 
[t]he State further asserts that, even assuming the statute does not fit within the 
special needs exception, Quinn consented to the search because § 28-673 
specifies that all those who drive a vehicle on Arizona roads consent to such a 
search. In support it relies on Tornabene v. Bonine ex reI. Ariz. Highway 
Dep't, 203 Ariz. 326,334,,19,54 P.3d 355, 363 (App.2002), which held, 
"driving in Arizona is not a right, but a privilege, subject to legislative 
mandate." 
State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 72, 178 P .3d 1190, 1196 (Ct. App. 2008) In rejecting the 
state's argument, the Court noted that the Fourth Amendment required probable cause for 
DUI prior to the extraction of blood: 
[n]ormally, because any forced extraction of blood by the State invades one's 
expectation of privacy in bodily integrity, the intrusion is subject to the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Jones, 203 Ariz. 1,9, , 27, 
49 P.3d 273, 281 (2002); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
767,86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). As Schmerber explains, the 
State's unconsented-to search of a person's blood requires probable cause to 
believe that the search will reveal the presence of controlled or intoxicating 
substances. 384 U.S. at 768-71,86 S.Ct. 1826. The Schmerber Court stated 
that: 
[t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment 
protects forbid any [ ] intrusions [into a person's blood] on the mere chance 
that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear 
indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental 
human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence 
may disappear .... 
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Id. at 769-70, 86 S.Ct. 1826. 
State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 68-69, 178 P.3d 1190, 1192-93 (Ct. App. 2008) Applying the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the statute, the Court ruled the statute an 
unconstitutional exercise of legislative authority: 
... states may not condition the grant of a privilege on the forfeiture of a 
constitutional right..."a statute cannot circumvent a firmly established 
constitutional right." 
As Schmerber makes clear, Quinn's constitutional right is to be free of any 
searches of her blood "[i] n the absence of a clear indication" that her blood 
would demonstrate the presence of alcohol or other controlled substances. 
Thus, within the limits of the Constitution, the State cannot condition Quinn's 
driving privilege on the surrender of her constitutional right not to have 
evidence admitted against her in a criminal prosecution that was taken from 
her without a consent and in the absence of probable cause. 
State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 73, 178 P.3d 1190, 1197 (Ct. App. 2008). 
In Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 587 S.E.2d 605 (2003), the Georgia Supreme 
Court dealt with a statute nearly identical to that in Quinn: 
[u]nder OCGA § 40-5-55(a), because Cooper was involved in an accident 
resulting in "serious injuries," as defined in subsection (c) of the statute, he 
was deemed by operation oflaw to have given consent to the administered 
blood test to determine ifthere was the presence of alcohol or any other drug. 
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282,285,587 S.E.2d 605,608 (2003)(citations omitted). The 
Georgia Court noted: 
[t]he high courts of several other states have grappled with the constitutionality 
of provisions allowing the chemical testing of bodily substances without 
probable cause or valid consent, and based solely on a serious traffic mishap. 
These courts have uniformly rejected provisions which obviate the finding of 
probable cause. See McDuff v. State, 763 Soold 850 (Miss.2000); Blank v. 
State, 3 P.3d 359 (Alaska 2000); King v. Ryan, 153 mold 449, 180 Ill.Dec. 
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260,607 N.E.2d 154 (1992); Commonwealth v. Kohl, 532 Pa. 152,615 A.2d 
308 (Pa.1992). Compare State v. Roche, 681 A.2d 472 (Maine 1996). 
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 287-88, 587 S.E.2d 605, 609-10 (2003). The Court then 
held, as did the Court in Quinn that an implied consent statute could not act to imply 
consent where to do so would require the waiver of a motorist's Fourth Amendment right 
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure: 
[t]his Court's use of the term "suspect" in regard to the Implied Consent 
Statute brings into sharp focus the flaw in that portion of the statute compelling 
chemical testing of the person merely by virtue of involvement in a traffic 
accident resulting in serious injury or fatality. There is no requirement of 
individualized suspicion, much less probable cause, that would render the 
person "suspect" of impaired driving. 
Thus, to the extent that OCGA § 40-5-55(a) requires chemical testing of the 
operator of a motor vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious 
injuries or fatalities regardless of any determination of probable cause, it 
authorizes unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the State and 
Federal Constitutions. 
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 290, 587 S.E.2d 605,611-12 (2003) In so holding the 
Court cited the following language from the Indiana Court of Appeals in Hannoy v. State, 
789 N.E.2d 977,987 (Ind.App.2003): 
[t]he legislature cannot, however, abrogate a person's Fourth Amendment 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined by the 
Supreme Court. To hold that the legislature could nonetheless pass laws 
stating that a person "impliedly" consents to searches under certain 
circumstances where a search would otherwise be unlawfUl would be to 
condone an unconstitutional bypassing o/the Fourth Amendment. 
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282,290,587 S.E.2d 605,611-12 (2003) The Court concluded 
by stating: 
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"The requirements of the Fourth Amendment cannot be lowered based upon 
the heinousness of the particular crime police are investigating." Hannoy v. 
State, supra at 988. The illegally-obtained test results were not admissible 
against Cooper at trial, and the trial court erred in denying Cooper's motion to 
suppress such evidence. 
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 291, 587 S.E.2d 605,613 (2003) 
In Hannay v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977, on reh'g~ 793 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind. ct. App. 
2003), the Indiana Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of the Marion County 
Sheriff Department's policy of obtaining blood samples without probable cause from 
drivers involved in accidents resulting in serious bodily injury or death. Id. Hannay was 
involved in an accident involving the death of another individual and, as in Quinn and 
Cooper, law enforcement lacked probable cause to believe Hannoy to be DUI. Rejecting 
a "special needs" argument as well as an argument that Indiana's implied consent statute 
authorized the blood draw, the Court found the warrantless blood draw unconstitutional: 
[t]he requirements of the Fourth Amendment cannot be lowered based upon 
the heinousness of the particular crime police are investigating. We are well 
aware of the pain and suffering inflicted by intoxicated drivers on our roads. 
Nevertheless, we do not perceive that our opinion today, which will apparently 
require alterations in the standard policy of at least one major Indiana law 
enforcement agency, will unduly burden law enforcement officers in collecting 
blood alcohol readings in cases such as this ... To the extent our holding today 
may lead to the loss of blood alcohol or illicit drug content evidence in some 
cases, we heed the words of the Supreme Court in Schmerber that the Fourth 
Amendment imposes limitations on the ability of police to investigate criminal 
activity and sometimes requires police to "suffer the risk" that certain evidence 
thereby will not be obtained. 384 U.S. at 770,86 S.Ct. at 1835. 
The withdrawal of Hannoy's blood was not obtained pursuant to the 
guidelines in the implied consent statutes and cannot be justified as being 
drawn in accordance with those statutes. The withdrawal was not 
accomplished in accordance with the Fourth Amendment and Schmerber 
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because there was no probable cause to believe Hannoy was intoxicated at the 
time his blood was drawn and no actual, knowing, and voluntary consent to 
the withdrawal. The "special needs" exception to the probable cause 
requirement cannot be applied in the context of a criminal investigation by 
law enforcement. Therefore, the blood alcohol content evidence obtained 
from the blood draw performed at the request of law enforcement was 
illegally obtained and should not have been admitted into evidence by the trial 
court. 
Hannay, at 987-89 on reh'g,. 793 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) 
The McNeely Court gave the clear mandate that "[i]n those drunk driving 
investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample 
can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth 
Amendment mandates that they do so." Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561, 185 L. 
Ed. 2d 696 (2013) Thus, after McNeely, a motorist arrested on suspicion ofDUI now clearly 
has a constitutional right to be free from warrantless intrusions into their body absent the 
existence of either a true showing of exigent circumstances cause or actual valid consent. As 
such, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine now prohibits the legislature from bypassing 
constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment and implying, or otherwise requiring, 
consent upon the act of accepting the privilege to drive. Thus, the Diaz decision cited by the 
State is inapplicable to this instant case. Consent cannot be implied when we are dealing 
with the prospect of "consenting away" a valid Fourth Amendment right. 
A search conducted by law enforcement officers without a warrant is per se 
unreasonable unless the State proves it fell within one ofthe narrowly drawn exceptions to 
the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 
13 
L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Dominguez, 137 Idaho 681, 683, 52 P.3d 325,327 
(Ct.App.2002). A search conducted with consent that was voluntarily given is one such 
exception. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041; Dominguez, 137 Idaho at 683,52 
P.3d at 327. The State has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the consent was voluntary rather than the result of duress or coercion, direct or implied. 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 221,93 S.Ct. 2041; State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796,69 P.3d 
1052, 1057 (2003); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552,554,989 P.2d 784, 786 (Ct.App.l999); 
Dominguez, 137 Idaho at 683, 52 P.3d at 327. A voluntary decision is one that is "the product 
of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225, 
93 S.Ct. 2041. See also, Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,602,81 S.Ct. 1860,6 
L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961). 
While blood was ultimately extracted from Defendant, it was not taken with his 
voluntary consent. It is not alleged that Defendant put up a violent struggle with the nurse or 
the officer when the blood was extracted. However, it is clear from the totality of the 
circumstances that he did not want to submit to any tests and that the blood was extracted 
after he had already refused the officer's repeated requests for a test to determine the 
concentration of alcohol in his body. Furthermore, mere acquiescence in the face of a claim 
of authority does not equate to voluntary consent: [t]he State's burden to show that consent 
was freely and voluntarily given cannot be met by "showing no more than acquiescence to a 
claim oflawful authority." State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 118, 175 P.3d 801,807 (Ct. App. 
2007)(quotingBumperv. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791-92,20 
14 
L.Ed.2d 797, 802 (1968». The ALS advisory told Defendant he was "required by law" to 
submit to the test. Given that fact, Defendant's mere acquiescence to the blood drawing 
process does not equate to voluntary consent. Defendant did not consent to the blood draw 
and thus consent cannot be used to subvert the requirement that law enforcement seek out a 
warrant. The proper remedy is the suppression of the warrantless blood draw consistent with 
Idaho court's rejection of the Leon Good Faith exception. State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 519, 
272 P.3d 483, 491 (2012) 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The defense requests that the District Court's order suppressing the evidence of the 
blood draw be upheld and the matter remanded for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this '3 day of Feb 
Douglas D. Phelps 
Phelps & Associates 
N. 2903 Stout Rd. 
Spokane, W A 99206 
(509) 892-0467 
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